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KILL THE MONSTER:PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL AS
AN INDEPENDENT CAUSE OF ACTION
SUSAN LORDE MARTIN*
ABSTRACT
Contract rules may be dissolving into tort-type notions of unfairness and injustice. Traditionally, promissory estoppel was viewed
as a substitute for consideration in situations where promisors
made promises knowing that promisees would act in reliance on
them, the promisees did act on the promises, and the promisors
refused to do what they promised to do, to the promisees detriment.
The purpose of promissory estoppel was clearly one of fairness
and preventing injustice by enforcing a promise not supported by
consideration in very limited circumstances. In recent cases,
however, courts have been approving the use of promissory estoppel as an independent cause of action to provide remedies for alleged contracts that otherwise would be unenforceable.
If contract rules are frequently displaced by ad hoc decisions
about unfairness, the predictability and reliability of business
transactions will diminish to the detriment of all who engage in
them. This Article will review the development of the doctrine of
promissory estoppel and the variations in its acceptance among
the states. It will consider the classification of promissory estoppel as an action at law or in equity and the doctrines weakening
of traditional contract rules, particularly the statute of frauds. This
Article concludes that it is not in the interest of businesspeople for
their contractual obligations to be governed by the communitys
shared sense of fairness rather than their specific bargained-for
exchanges of promises, as governed by classic contract rules. The
former provides no reliability or predictability, just confusion
and more opportunity for litigation.
* Cypr
esFam ily Distinguished ProfessorofLegalStudiesin Business, Zarb
SchoolofBusiness, Hofstra University. Research forthisarticle wassupported
byaZarbSchoolSum m erResearch Grant.

1

2

WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:001
TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................ 3
I. THE DOCTRINE OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL.................................. 6
II. PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL:A CLAIM AT LAW OR IN EQUITY?........ 13
III. THE COMMON LAW EXPANSION OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL ... 17
IV. WEAKENING THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS ................................... 19
V. ENCOURAGING CONFUSION AND LITIGATION ............................ 28
CONCLUSION ................................................................................. 31

2016]

KILL THE MONSTER

3

INTRODUCTION
A dissenting justicein a TexasCourtofAppealscastigated his
court
sm ajority forlegislating from the bench and creating a m onster:prom issory estoppelas a free standing cause ofaction.1 He
advised killing it now before it kills m any other causes ofaction.2 Thistwenty-firstcentury case bringsto m ind GrantGilm ore
s 1974 book The Death of Contract,3 in which Professor
Gilm ore argued thatcontractlaw m ay be swallowed up by tort4
becauseoftheeffectivedism antling oftheform alsystem ofclassicalcontracttheory.5 Henoted, forexam ple, thatthedoctrineof
prom issoryestoppelm aybeovercom ingbasiccontractprinciples
likethestatuteoffrauds, statutesoflim itation, and theparolevidencerule.6
A review ofcaseswherecourtshaveconsidered thedoctrineof
prom issory estoppelsuggeststhat, in fact, contractrulesm ay be
dissolvingintotort-typenotionsofunfairnessand injustice. Traditionally, prom issoryestoppelwasviewed asa substituteforconsideration in situationswhereprom isorsm adeprom isesknowing
thatprom iseeswouldactin relianceon them , theprom iseesdidact
on the prom ises, and to the prom isee
s detrim ent, the prom isors
FrostCrushed StoneCo. v. OdellGeerConstr. Co., 110 S.W.3d 41, 48 (Tex.
Ct. App. 2002)(Gray, J., dissenting).
2 Id.
3 GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (
1974)(Ronald K. L. Collins
ed., 1995).
4 Id. at103.
5 Id. at72.
6 Id. at 73. In f
act, courts have uniform ly disallowed the doctrine of
prom issory estoppeltoovercom etheparolevidencerule. See, e.g., Newpaper,
LLC v. Party City Corp., No. 13-1735 ADM/LIB, 2014 WL 2986653, at*9 (D.
Minn. July 1, 2014);Adler v. Elk Glenn, LLC, No. 12-85-ART, 2013 WL
6632057, at*9 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 17, 2013);Hoferv. Liberty Nat
lBank, No. CIV
11-4129-KES, 2012 WL 5945169, at *6 (D.S.D. Nov. 28, 2012);Prentice v.
UDC AdvisoryServ., Inc., 648 N.E.2d 146, 153 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995);Mishlerv.
Hale, 26 N.E.3d 1260, 1270 (Ohio Ct. App. 2014);Big G Corp. v. Henry, 536
A.2d 559, 562 (Vt. 1987). Courts have in few instances allowed prom issory
estoppelclaim stogoforward when statutesoflim itationshaverun. See, e.g.,
Huddleston v. Huddleston, No. CIV-14-597-R, 2014 WL 5317922, at*3 (W.D.
Okla. Oct. 16, 2014);GE MobileWater, Inc. v. Red DesertReclam ation, LLC,
6 F. Supp. 3d 195, 202 (D.N.H. 2014).
1
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refusetodowhattheyprom ised todo.7 Thepurposeofprom issory
estoppelwas clearly one offairness and preventing injustice by
enforcing a prom ise notsupported by consideration in very lim ited circum stances.8 In recentcases, however, courtshave been
approvingtheuseofprom issoryestoppelasan independentcause
ofaction toproviderem ediesforalleged contractsthatotherwise
would beunenforceable.9
Ifcontractrulesarefrequently displaced by ad hocdecisions
about unfairness, the predictability and reliability ofbusiness
transactionswilldim inish tothedetrim entofallwhoengagein
them . Although there isfrequentdiscussion in legislaturesand
newspapers about tort reform 10 that is, m aking it harder for
plaintiffsto win negligence and strictliability casesagainstbusiness defendants one rarely hears about contract reform . But
being able to rely on contractsentered into with the knowledge
thattraditionalcontractlaw ruleswillapply and notbedistorted
orelim inated byfact-sensitivetort-typeconsiderationsm aybea
sim ilarlyim portantlegalissueforbusinessestoconsider.
See, e.g., Ricketts v. Scothorn, 77 N.W. 365, 367 (Neb. 1898)(calling it
equitable estoppel butdefining prom issory estoppel:Having intentionally
influenced the plaintiffto alterherposition forthe worse on the faith ofthe
note being paid when due, it would be grossly inequitable to perm it the
m aker, orhisexecutor, toresistpaym enton theground thattheprom isewas
given withoutconsideration.);see also Kahn v. Cecelia Co., 40 F. Supp. 878,
879 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) (noting that prom issory estoppel, a doctrine of com paratively recent origin, is usually a substitute for consideration with
lim ited application in New York).
8 See, e.g., Chrysl
erCorp. v. ChaplakeHoldings, Ltd., 822 A.2d 1024, 1031,
1034 (Del. 2003) (noting that prevention of injustice is the 
fundam ental
ideaunderlying the doctrine of prom issory estoppel); Faim on v. Winona
StateUniv., 540 N.W.2d 879, 883 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995)(citingRESTATEMENT
(SECOND)OF CONTRACTS §90(1)(1981)).
9 See, e.g., Al
aska Dem ocratic Party v. Rice, 934 P.2d 1313, 131617
(Alaska 1997)(holding thatprom issory estoppelcould overcom e a statute of
frauds defense in em ploym ent cases);Traco, Inc. v. Arrow Glass Co., 814
S.W.2d 186, 189 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991)(holding thatprom issory estoppelisan
independentcauseofaction in bid construction cases).
10 See, e.g., Ki
m berley A. Strassel, Op-Ed., A Silver Lining in Washington,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 30, 2015, atA11 (noting thatNew York HouseRepublicans
willreintroduce im portanttort-reform bill);Allysia Finley, Op-Ed., Behind
the GOP Statehouse Juggernaut, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1314, 2014, at A11
(noting thatpassing tortreform willbe a hotissuein m any states).
7
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This Article willreview the developm ent ofthe doctrine of
prom issory estoppel11 and the variationsin itsacceptance am ong
thestates. Itwillconsidertheclassification ofprom issory estoppelasan action atlaw orin equity and the doctrine
sweakening
oftraditionalcontractrules, particularly the statute offrauds.
An exam ination ofcases discussing the doctrine ofprom issory
estoppelindicatesthe confusion thatexistsaboutthistopicand
thewiderangeofopinionsand conclusionsam ong courts.12 This
Article concludesthatitisnotin the interestofbusinesspeople
for their contractualobligations to be governed by the com m unity
s shared sense offairness13 ratherthan theirspecificbargained-forexchangesofprom isesasgoverned byclassiccontract
rules.14 The form erprovidesno reliability orpredictability, just
11 A greatdealhasbeen wri
tten aboutthedoctrineofprom issoryestoppel.
See, e.g., Charles Calleros, Cause, Consideration, Promissory Estoppel, and
Promises Under Deed: What Our Students Should Know about Enforcement of
Promises in A Historical and International Context, 13 CHI.-KENT J. INT
L&
COMP. L. 83, 101 (2013);JenniferCam ero, Zombieland: Seeking Refuge from
the Statute of Frauds in Contracts for the Sale of Services or Goods, 82 UMKC
L. REV. 1, 18 (2013);Gerald Caplan, Legal Autopsies: Assessing the Performance of Judges and Lawyers Through the Window of Leading Contract
Cases, 73 ALB. L. REV. 1, 1217 (2009);Gina M. Chang, Note, McInerney v.
Charter Golf, Inc.: The Court Swings and Misses, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 907,
908 (1998);David G. Epstein etal., Contract Laws Two P.E.s: Promissory
Estoppel and the Parol Evidence Rule, 62 BAYLOR L. REV. 397, 398 (2010);
David J. Gass, Michigans UCC Statute of Frauds and Promissory Estoppel,
74 MICH. B.J. 524, 524 (June1995);EricMillsHolm es, Restatement of Promissory Estoppel, 32 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 263, 26566 (1996); Marco J.
Jim enez, The Many Faces of Promissory Estoppel: An Empirical Analysis
Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 57 UCLA L. REV. 669, 66970
(2010);Nicholas J. Johnson, The Statutory UCC: Interpretative License and
Duty under Article 2, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 1073, 112224 (2012);Stephen J.
Leacock, Fingerprints of Equitable Estoppel and Promissory Estoppel on the
Statute of Frauds in Contract Law, 2 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 73, 73 (2011);
MichaelB. Metzger & MichaelJ. Phillips, Promissory Estoppel and Third
Parties, 42 SW. L.J. 931, 39192 (1988).
12 See, e.g., Aaron R. Pet
ty, The Reliance Interest in Restitution, 32 S. ILL.
U. L.J. 365, 38283 (2008)(asserting confusion aboutdoctrine ofprom issory
estoppeland variation am ongcourtsin applyingit).
13 Charl
esFried, Aziyah: The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract, 93 HARV.
L. REV. 1858, 1858 (1980)(reviewing P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1979)).
14 Forext
ensivetheoreticaldiscussionsofthisissue, seeCHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE:A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION (
1981);Anthony

6
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m oreopportunity forlitigation. Italsocreatesa greatdealofconfusion forbusinesseswhen courtsin differentstates, andeven state
and federalcourtsin thesam estate, takesuch varied approaches
totheprom issoryestoppeldoctrine. Therefore, statelegislatures
shouldconsiderenactingprom issoryestoppelstatutesthatprovide
forthedoctrinetoactonlyasaconsideration substituteundercertain lim ited circum stances, soastocreatean enforceablecontract
thatissubjecttotraditionalcontractrules. Injusticespropagated
byenforcem entofcontractrulescan bealleviated byotherexistingdoctrinessuch aspartperform ance15 andunconscionability.16
I. THE DOCTRINE OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL
In the United States, a traditional requirem ent of an enforceablecontractisconsideration thathasbeen bargained for.17
Thatis, each party m ustprom iseeithertoactortorefrain from
acting to induce the other party to do likewise.18 Situations in
which prom issory estoppelwasfirstapplied occurred when lack
of consideration would have precluded a prom ise from being
enforced.19 However, the additionalcircum stances ofdetrim ental
reliance on a prom ise thatwasm ade, knowing itwould induce
action, m adethefailuretoenforcetheprom iseseem unjust.20 To
rem edythissituation, courtslooked toestoppel.

Townsend Kronm an, A New Champion for the Will Theory, 91 YALE L.J. 404,
406 (1981)(reviewing CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE:A THEORY OF
CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION (1981)).
15 See, e.g., MessnerVet
ereBergerMcNam eeSchm ettererEuroRSCG Inc.
v. Aegis Group plc, 711 N.E.2d 953, 956 (N.Y. 1999) (part perform ance
doctrine based on equitable principlesand applied when itwould be a fraud
to allow a party to an oralcontractto escape perform ance after perm itting
theotherparty toperform in relianceon theagreem ent).
16 See, e.g., Murphy v. McNam ara, 416 A.2d 170, 176 (
Conn. Super. Ct.
1979)(notingthatunconscionabilitydoctrineisappliedtopreventinjusticewhen
bargain involving disadvantaged persons is very one-sided or unreasonable
butgenerallynotavailabletom erchants).
17 Sf
reddo v. Sfreddo, 720 S.E.2d 145, 154 (Va. Ct. App. 2012);RESTATEMENT (
SECOND)OF CONTRACTS §71(1)(1981);Donald J. Sm ythe, The Scope of a
Bargain and the Value of a Promise, 60 S.C. L. REV. 203, 20506 (2008).
18 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §75 cm t
. b(1932).
19 Mer
exA.G. v. FairchildWeston Syst., Inc., 29 F.3d821, 824(2dCir. 1994).
20 Id.
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Sam uelWilliston, the chiefreporter for the Restatem entof
Contracts,21 spoke ofgenuine estoppelas a rule thatsays one
who has led anotherto actin reasonable reliance on his representations offact cannot afterwards in litigation between the
two deny the truth ofthe representations.22 Thisshield from a
wrongdoer
s m isrepresentations has com e to be known as equitableestoppeland hasbeen applied bycourtsin theUnited States
for m ore than 150 years.23 In this form ulation, courts used estoppelto protectan innocentparty who had been m isled about
thefacts(notprom isesorintentions)ofa dealand, becauseofa
m isrepresentation offacts, could nothaveprotected him selfin a
contract.24 Equitable estoppelwasnotbeing used as a cause of
action, butasa defense by an innocentparty when a m isrepresenteroffactsattem pted toenforceacontract.25
In his 1920 treatise on contracts, Professor Williston noted
thatsom e courtswere using the principle ofestoppelto enforce
an otherwisenonexistentcontractualobligation when therewas
no m isrepresentation offact.26 Instead, a prom iseesuffered detrim ent by relying on a gratuitous prom ise, not on a m isstatem entoffact.27 Hegaveexam plesofthisuseofestoppelin cases
involving charitable subscriptions;gratuitous debtorsprom ises
topay, inducingcreditorsnottobringan action untilthestatute
oflim itationshad run;andgratuitousprom isestoselllandornot
toforeclosea m ortgagewhen a prom iseem adeim provem entson
theproperty.28 Heoffered thatin such cases, wheretheprom isee
isrelyingon a prom ise, notam isstatem entoffact, an appropriate
term todescribeitshould be
prom issoryestoppelorsom ething
equivalent to m ark the distinction.29 In 1932, Judge Learned
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS (1932).
SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §139 (1920).
23 See, e.g., Maj
orLeagueBaseballv. Morsani, 790 So. 2d 1071, 1077 (Fla.
2001);Cooglerv. Rogers, 7 So. 391, 394 (1889);Cam p v. Moseley, 2 Fla. 171,
171 (1848).
24 JoelM. Ngugi
, Promissory Estoppel: The Life History of an Ideal Legal
Transplant, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 425, 45758 (2007).
25 Hoyev. West
field Ins. Co., 487 N.W.2d 838, 842 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992).
26 WILLISTON, supra not
e22.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
21
22
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Hand concluded that prom issory estoppelwas a recognized speciesofconsideration.30
Through recent tim es, som e courts seem to have difficulty
characterizing prom issory estoppel so that it fits in accepted
legalparadigm s. In 2006, theUnited StatesDistrictCourtforthe
Middle DistrictofAlabam a declared thatthe fullcontours ofthe
doctrine ofprom issory estoppelare ill-defined and stilldeveloping as part ofAlabam a
s com m on law.31 More than thirty-five
years ago, the Massachusetts Suprem e JudicialCourtdeclared
thatitwould notuse the term prom issory estoppelbecause it
causesconfusion.32 Through the years, courtsinterpreting Massachusetts law have cited thatsentim ent.33 Nevertheless, Massachusetts courts have enforced prom ises based on detrim ental
reliance, characterizing them ascontractsenforceable pursuant
to a 
traditionalcontracttheoryantedating them odern doctrine
ofconsideration.34 One Massachusetts courtheld that[p]rom issory estoppelis notan independentcause ofaction. Itis an
alternative m ethod ofestablishing consideration sufficientto create a contract.35 A Texasappellatecourthassaid thatprom issory
estoppeldoesnotcreate a contractwhere none existed before,36
while the United States District Court in Maryland, applying
Maryland law, hassaid thatprom issory estoppelperm itsrecoverywherethereisnocontract.37
Porterv. Com m 
rR. 10.2.1(i), 60 F.2d 673, 675 (2d Cir. 1932).
Sykesv. Payton, 441 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1223 (M.D. Ala. 2006).
32 Loranger Const
r. Corp. v. E. F. Hauserm an Co., 384 N.E.2d 176, 179
(Mass. 1978).
33 See, e.g., Oz Hol
ding LCC v. Elm Court Realty LLC, No. 09 Civ.
7427(PGG), 2010 WL 2730476, at*4 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2010)(applying
Massachusetts law and noting that Massachusetts does not use the label
prom issory estoppel);R.I. Hosp. TrustNat
lBank v. Varadian, 647 N.E.2d
1174, 1179 (Mass. 1995)(noting that the jurisdiction does not use the expression prom issory estoppel).
34 Loranger Const
r. Corp. v. E. F. Hauserm an Co., 384 N.E.2d 176, 179
(Mass. 1978); Pease v. Jernigan, 2014 Mass. App. Div. 169, 171 (2014);
Spectrum Sales, Inc. v. Cobham Def. Elec. Sys., No. MICV201303349, 2014
WL 1758109, at*5 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 4, 2014).
35 Lom bardo v. Mauri
ello, No. 990390F, 2002 WL 31492393, at *3 n.6
(Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 26, 2002).
36 Maddoxv. Vant
ageEnergy, LLC, 361 S.W.3d752, 761 (Tex. Ct. App. 2012).
37 Odyssey TravelCt
r., Inc. v. RO Cruises, Inc., 262 F. Supp. 2d 618, 626
(D. Md. 2003).
30
31
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Many courts have confronted the issue ofusing prom issory
estoppelasa sword thatis, asan independentcause ofaction
toenforcean otherwiseunenforceableprom ise, ratherthan m erely
as a shield to avoid disadvantaging a prom isee who did not
give consideration to supporta prom ise butwho reasonably relied on the prom ise to his or her detrim ent.38 Courts in som e
stateshaveheld thatprom issory estoppelisnotan independent
cause ofaction at all.39 The Virginia Suprem e Courthas held
thatprom issory estoppelis notan independentcause ofaction
in the Com m onwealth.40 The United States District Court in
Oregon hasheld in an em ploym entcase thatprom issory estoppelisonly a substitute forconsideration and cannotbe used as
an independentcauseofaction.41
On the otherhand, the United States DistrictCourtforthe
Eastern DistrictofMichigan hasnoted thatalthough Michigan
does not recognize an independent cause of action for detrim entalreliance, itdoesrecognize prom issory estoppel ofwhich
detrim ental reliance is an elem ent as a distinct cause of action.42 Michigan courtshave described prom issory estoppelasa
tortthatisakin toa contractclaim .43
In Texas, an appellate courtdeclared thatprom issory estoppelcan actonly asa defensein som e contexts, butcan serve as
an independentcauseofaction in others.44 Thecourtsaid itcan
Jablon v. United States, 657 F.2d 1064, 1068 (9th Cir. 1981).
Suburban Hosp., Inc. v. Sam pson, 807 F. Supp. 31, 33 (D. Md. 1992).
40 Guardi
an Pharm acy v. WeberCity Healthcare, No. 2:12cv00037, 2013
WL 277771, at*7 (W.D. Va. Jan. 24, 2013);Nasserv. WhitePages, Inc., No.
5:12cv097, 2013 WL 6147677, at*5 (W.D. Va. Nov. 22, 2013);W.J. Schafer
Assocs. v. CordantInc., 493 S.E.2d 512, 516 (Va. 1997).
41 Rym an v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 05-CV-1106-BR, 2006 WL 1720534,
at*7 (D. Or. June 19, 2006). The Oregon CourtofAppeals has stated that
[i]n Oregon, itis wellrecognized thatprom issory estoppelis nota 
cause of
actionin itself, butis a subsetand a theory ofrecovery in breach ofcontract
actions. Neiss v. Ehlers, 899 P.2d 700, 706 (Or. Ct. App. 1995). See also
Barnesv. Yahoo, Inc., 570 F.3d1096, 1106 (9th Cir. 2009)(notingthatin Oregon
and m ostotherstates, prom issory estoppelisa subsetofa theory ofrecovery
basedon abreach ofcontractand servesasa substituteforconsideration).
42 1200 Si
xth St., LLC v. United States, 848 F. Supp. 2d 767, 776 (E.D.
Mich. 2012).
43 Id. at 777 (
quoting Byrne v. Republic Bank, No. 268762, 2007 WL
2560467, at*4n.2 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 6, 2007)).
44 Lot
itov. KnifeRiverCorp., 391 S.W.3d 226, 227 (Tex. Ct. App. 2012).
38
39
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be used only asa shield, nota sword,and concluded thatin the
em ploym entcontext, prom issoryestoppelisadefensethatprevents
a prom isorfrom avoiding a contractthatfallsunderthestatute
offrauds.45 Thecourtdid notclarifywhyan action toforcean em ployertohirean em ployeebecauseofaprom isethatwasnotm ade
in writingasrequired bycontractruleswasm erelyadefense.46
In bid construction cases, Texascourtshaveheld thatprom issory estoppelcan bean independentcauseofaction.47 In Frost
Crushed Stone Co. v. Odell Geer Construction Co.,48 Geersubm itted a bid as a subcontractorto supply rock fora highway project.49 GeerallegedthatFrostagreedin atelephoneconversation to
supplytherock fortheproject, and afterthatconversation, Geer
contracted with Texas Trucking Com pany to haulthe rock if
Geer
s bid was successful.50 AfterGeer
s bid was accepted, Frost
sentGeera written price quote forthe rock and Geersigned a
contractwith TexasTrucking Com pany to haulthe rock.51 Severalm onthslater, Frostinform ed Geerthatitwould notbeable
to supply the rock.52 Geersued Frostundera theory ofprom issory estoppel, interalia, alleging thatFrostprom ised to supply
the rock knowing Geer would rely on the prom ise and, in fact,
Geer did rely on it in signing a hauling contract with Texas
Trucking Com pany.53 The courtheld thatGeer was seeking affirm ative reliefunder the equitable doctrine ofprom issory estoppel based on the prem ise that it detrim entally relied on
Frost
soralbid,and thatGeerwasentitled to the am ountnecessary to restore him to the position in which he would have
been had henotrelied on [Frost
s]prom ise.54 Thisresultseem s
unfairtothesubcontractorFrostbecauseGeercould havewalked
away from theirdealatany tim e up untilitbegan working on
the highway project, butFrostdid nothave the sam e option.55
Id.
Id.
47 Id.;Tr
aco, Inc. v. Arrow GlassCo., 814S.W.2d186, 189 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991).
48 110 S.W.3d 41 (
Tex. Ct. App. 2002).
49 Id. at44.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id. at4546.
54 Id. at4647.
55 Id. at44.
45
46

2016]

KILL THE MONSTER

11

Geercould haveprotected itselffrom Frost
sfailure to deliverby
signing a written agreem entwith Frost. Underthe Frost prom issory estoppeldecision, Geer gets to have it both ways:Geer
can decide notto do businesswith Frost, butFrostisobligated
todowhatitprom ised todo.56
Unlike the purported law in Texasregarding prom issory estoppelin em ploym entcases, in Verm ont, prom issory estoppelis
an independentcauseofaction thatcan beused tom odifyan atwillem ploym entrelationship and providea rem edyforwrongful
discharge.57 In Foote v. Simmonds Precision Products Company,
Footealleged thathewasdischarged becauseheused thegrievance procedure described in the com pany
s em ployee hand58
book. The handbook prom ised em ployeesthatifthey followed
the procedure, they would notbe criticized or penalized in any
way.59 Foote followed the procedure, wasfired, and claim ed that
he relied on this prom ise ofnon-retaliation.60 The Verm ontSuprem e Court concluded that an em ployer who m akes such a
statem entin an em ployeehandbook should expectaction orforbearance on the partofthe prom isee asa resultofthe statem ent,
and that prom issory estoppel could serve as an independent
cause ofaction, m odify an at-willem ploym entrelationship, and
provide a rem edy for wrongfulterm ination.61 The plaintiff in
this case also broughtactions under express and im plied contracttheories, butthe jury based itsverdictonly on prom issory
estoppel, and the Verm ont Suprem e Court affirm ed the decision.62 Itisunderstandablethata lay jury would find an appeal
to justice and fairnessattractive, butthiscase could have been
decided based on thecontractcreated bytheem ployeehandbook
forallem ployees, including those serving atwill. Itisunfortunate that the court allowed prom issory estoppelto be used in
this kind of case, when traditional contract rules could have
created thesam eresult.
Id. at46.
Footev. Sim m ondsPrecision Prods. Co., 613 A.2d 1277, 1280 (Vt. 1992).
58 Id. at1278.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id. at128081. See also Madden v. Om ega Opt
ical, Inc., 683 A.2d 386,
392 (Vt. 1996)(holding thatprom issory estoppelm ay m odify at-willem ploym entrelationship).
62 Foote, 613 A.2d at1278.
56
57
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In 2010, a lowercourtin Verm ontdescribed prom issory estoppelasa wellestablished[,] valid and independentcauseofaction
thatm ayberaised byat-willem ployeesin ordertoprovewrongfuldischarge.63 Thelaw in Iowa issim ilar.64 TheIowa Suprem e
Court, in a case offirstim pression considering whetherprom issoryestoppelisavailablein at-willem ploym entcases, quoted cases
stating that
[p]rom issory estoppelis now a recognized species
of consideration,65 and in prom issory estoppel claim s, detrim entalreliance on one side willsuffice as 
consideration.
66 The
courtconcluded that[p]rom issory estoppelissim ply anothertheory by which an em ployerm ay be held to his prom ise,and nothing about at-willem ploym ent precludes that.67 Here, the court
attem pted to adhere to the traditionaluse ofprom issory estoppelasa substituteforconsideration, butstretched the m eaning
ofconsideration todoso.68
TheSuprem eCourtofDelawarehasm aintained theoriginal
notion ofprom issory estoppelas a consideration substitute in
cases where a contract has not been form ed,69 and its fundam entalideais the prevention ofinjustice.70 In Delaware, prom issory estoppelcan be pled asan independentcause ofaction.71
Straw v. Visiting Nurse Ass
n & Hospice, No. 741-10-09 Wrcv., 2010 WL
2259080 (Vt. Sup. Ct. Jan. 2010).
64 Compare St
raw, 2010 WL 2259080 (ruling thatan at-willem ployeecan
raise a prom issory estoppelclaim ), with Schoffv. Com bined Ins. Co., 604
N.W.2d 43, 47 (Iowa 1999)(ruling thatan at-willem ployeeand em ployercan
altertherelationship byan em ployeehandbook and theem ployerisbound by
thatagreem ent).
65 Schoff, 604 N.W.2d at48 (
citing Millerv. Lawlor, 66 N.W.2d 267, 272
(Iowa1954)).
66 Id. (
citing Huhtala v. Travelers Ins. Co., 257 N.W.2d 640, 647 n.16
(Mich. 1977)).
67 Id. at49. TheNebraska Suprem eCourthasrecogni
zed acauseofaction
forprom issory estoppelin connection with detrim entalrelianceon a prom ise
ofat-willem ploym ent, but not necessarily in connection with detrim ental
reliance on other prom ises m ade to an at-willem ployee. Blinn v. Beatrice
Cm ty. Hosp. & Health Ctr., 708 N.W.2d 235, 247 (Neb. 2006).
68 Schoff, 604N.W.2d at48.
69 Chr
yslerCorp. v. ChaplakeHoldings, Ltd., 822 A.2d1024, 1031 (Del. 2003).
70 Id. at1034.
71 Id. at1032. In Connect
icut, prom issory estoppelcan also be pled asan
independent cause ofaction. Grey v. Greenwich Hills Ass
n, No. FSTCV136019725S, 2014 WL 1568402, at*4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 20, 2014). The
Suprem e Court of Colorado has explained that prom issory estoppelis an
63
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Sim ilarly, courts in Kentucky have recognized prom issory estoppelas an independent cause ofaction.72 The theory ofthe
action isthatdetrim entalreliancebecom esa substituteforconsideration in a variety of situations, including the em ploym ent
context, when injustice can be avoided only by giving effectto
the [gratuitous] prom ise.73 The problem , as evidenced in the
Texas Frost case, is that often the party pleading prom issory
estoppelshould have protected him or herselfby entering into
an enforceable contract.74 The party pleading prom issory estoppelgets to have a distinct advantage:ifa contract would not
have been in thatparty
sfavor, then thereisnocontract;butifa
contractwould benefitthatparty, then prom issory estoppelcreatescontractualobligations.
II. PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL:A CLAIM AT LAW OR IN EQUITY?
Anotherarea ofconfusion involveswhethercourtsshould categorize a claim ofprom issory estoppelas sounding atlaw or in
equity. Asearlyasthefourteenth century, theEnglish Chancery
granted reliefto a plaintiffwho suffered detrim entin response
to a defendant
s failure to perform his reciprocalprom ise.75 At
independentcause ofaction. WheatRidge Urban RenewalAuth. v. CornerstoneGrp. XXII, LLC, 176 P.3d 737, 741 (Colo. 2007). TheSuprem eCourtof
Arkansashasheld thatthere isan independentcause ofaction forprom issory
estoppelor detrim entalreliance. Van Dyke v. Glover, 934 S.W.2d 204, 209
(Ark. 1996). TheArizona CourtofAppealshasheld thatprom issory estoppel
can beused asa causeofaction fordam ages. TiffanyInc. v. W. M. K. Transit
Mix, Inc., 493 P.2d 1220, 1224(Ariz. Ct. App. 1972).
72 Jackson v. JB HuntTransp., Inc., 384 S.W.3d 177, 184 (
Ky. Ct. App.
2012). Indiana also recognizesprom issory estoppelasan independentcause
ofaction. Biddle v. BAA Indianapolis, LLC, 830 N.E.2d 76, 87 (Ind. Ct. App.
2005). Illinois recognizes prom issory estoppel as an independent cause of
action. Newton TractorSales, Inc. v. Kubota TractorCorp., 906 N.E.2d 520,
521 (Ill. 2009)(overruling DeWittv. Flem ing, 828 N.E.2d 756, 760 (Ill. Ct.
App. 2005)and LawrenceH. Flynn, Inc. v. Philip MorrisUSA, Inc., No. 05 C
318, 2006-1 TradeCases¶ 75, 141, TradeReg. Rep. (CCH), 2006 WL 6469806
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 19, 2006)). Georgia recognizesprom issory estoppelasan independentcause ofaction. Houston v. Houston, 600 S.E.2d 395, 396 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2004).
73 Mc
Carthyv. LouisvilleCartageCo., 796 S.W.2d10, 12 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990).
74 See CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 8.1 (
Joseph M. Perillo ed., 2015)[hereinafterCORBIN ON CONTRACTS].
75 J.B. Am es, The History of Assumpsit, 2 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1415 (
1888).
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thattim e, the breach ofa prom ise wasviewed asa tortand reliefwasgiven in equityforthelossofthething given in reliance
on theprom ise.76 Gradually, bytheseventeenth century, English
courtscam etoview actionsforbreachesofprom isesascontract
actions, and theyassessed dam agesforthefailuretoreceivethe
benefitofthe prom isor
sprom ise the prom isee
sexpectation interest.77 In recentyearsin theUnitedStates, thequestion ofprom issory estoppelsounding in law orequity hasbeen addressed by
num erouscourtsin ordertodecidewhetheraplaintiffisentitled
toajuryorwhatrem edyisappropriate.
TheSuprem eCourtofMinnesotaconcludedthat, in Minnesota,
prom issory estoppelderived from the English Chancery
s equitable cause of action based on good-faith reliance; however,
according tothecourt, notallprom issory estoppelclaim sarenecessarily equitable.78 The court said it m ust focus on the elem entsof[the plaintiff
s]cause ofaction,and in the case athand
where the plaintiff
s cause ofaction was based on equitable goodfaith reliance,the courtconcluded thather cause ofaction was
equitablein nature,and thatshewasnotentitled toa jurytrial.79
TheUnitedStatesCourtofAppealsfortheEighth Circuitheard
a case in which a lessoralleged itboughta building in reliance
on the defendant
soralprom ise to lease 25,000 feetofthe building for twenty-five years, and the defendant never followed
through on theprom ise.80 Thelessordem anded a jury in itssuit
to enforce the prom ise, and the defendantm oved to strike the
jury trialdem and.81 Thecourtapplied Minnesota law, which required contractsfora leaseofm ore than oneyeartobein writing;thus, thelessorhad a statuteoffraudsproblem thatittried
toovercom eusingprom issoryestoppel.82 TheEighth Circuithad
todecidewhetherthelessorhad a Seventh Am endm entrightto
a jury trial.83 Thecourtreasoned thatprom issory estoppelcould
Id. at15.
Id.
78 Ol
sonv. SynergisticTech. Bus. Sys., Inc., 628 N.W.2d142, 152 (Minn. 2001).
79 Id. at15253.
80 Incom pass IT, Inc. v. XO Com m c
ns Serv., Inc., 719 F.3d 891, 894 (8th
Cir. 2013).
81 Id. at895.
82 Id.
83 Id. at897.
76
77
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be either a legalclaim or an equitable claim depending on the
context.84 Because the lessor was using prom issory estoppelto
avoid the statute offrauds, the courtheld thatthe claim was
equitable.85 More im portantly, according to thecourt, the lessor
was seeking reliance dam ages as a rem edy;that is, a rem edy
thatwould putitin the position itwould have been in had the
contractnotbeen m ade, andreliancedam agesareequitable.86 The
court discounted the lessor
s apparent claim for expectation
dam ages in the form ofrentalincom e it would have received
from thedefendant, had thedefendantkeptitsprom isetolease
space.87 Based on theforegoing analysis, thecourtheld thatthe
lessorwasnotentitled toa jury trialbecause ofthe undeniably
equitable nature ofthe prom issory estoppelclaim asa whole.88
TheUnited StatesDistrictCourtin Nevada, applying Nevada
law, held thata prom issory estoppelclaim exists to provide a
rem edy in equity when thereisnocontractduetoa lack ofconsideration;89 however, ifprom issory estoppelis being used as a
substituteforconsideration, itwould m akesensetoconsiderthe
resultacontractwith alegalrem edyforbreach.
On the other hand, a courtin Pennsylvania thathad to decidewhethera plaintiffm akinga prom issoryestoppelclaim was
entitled to a jury90 decided in the affirm ative,91 although this
reasoning only exem plifiesthe confusion thatoccurswhen courts
attem pttoclassify prom issory estoppelasa causeofaction that
sounds atlaw or in equity.92 The Pennsylvania CourtofCom m on Pleas first discussed the Pennsylvania Suprem e Court
s
recognition oftheequitablebasisofprom issoryestoppel, characterizing it as not so m uch one of contract.93 Then, the court
at896.
Id. at897.
86 Id. at898.
87 Id.
88 Id. at899.
89 Duar
tev. WellsFargoBank, No. 3:13-cv-00371-RCJ-VPC, 2014WL 585802,
at*4(D. Nev. Feb. 14, 2014)(entitlem enttoajurywasnotan issuein thiscase).
90 Osborne-Davi
s Transp. Co. v. MothersWork Inc., No. 02512, 2008 WL
2175580, at*54(Pa. Com . Pl. Feb. 20, 2008).
91 Id. at*59.
92 Id. at*57*58.
93 Id. at*57.
84 Id.
85
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cited the Suprem e Court
s(1)affirm ing a jury verdictin a prom issory estoppelcase;(2)holdingthatforstatuteoflim itation purposes, prom issory estoppelisa breach ofcontractclaim ;and (3)
statingthatprom issoryestoppelperm itsan equitablerem edytoa
contractdisputeand soundsin contractlaw.94 Thecourtconcluded
thattheplaintiffwasentitled toajurybecausetheclaim wasfor
m onetary dam ages only.95 Five years later, the United States
DistrictCourtfortheEastern DistrictofPennsylvania, applying
Pennsylvania law, opined thatprom issory estoppelstops short
ofcreating a contract governed by law,96 butthen held thatit
im pliesa contractin law wherenocontractexistsin fact.97
Itisno wonderthatthe MissouriSuprem e Courtnoted that
prom issory estoppelisnota favorite ofthe law.98 In a 2007 case,
thecourtlisted theusualelem entsofa prom issoryestoppelclaim :
the prom isorm akes a prom ise expecting the prom isee to actin
reliance on itand the prom isee relies on itto his or her detrim ent.99 But the court focused on the Restatem ent
s additional
elem ent:a resulting injustice thatonly enforcem entofthe prom ise could cure.100 Thecourtconcluded thattheplaintiffshad an
availablerem edyin law through anegligenceaction, andtherefore
an equitable rem edy for prom issory estoppelwas notappropriate.101 Severalyears earlier, a Missouriappellate courtopined
thatthedoctrineofprom issory estoppelistobeused with caution,
sparinglyand onlyin extrem ecasesto avoid unjustresults.102
at*57*58.
Id. at*60. The Suprem e CourtofPennsylvania hasheld that, because
prom issory estoppelm akesotherwise unenforceable agreem entsbinding, the
doctrine soundsin contractlaw.Crouse v. CyclopsIndus., 745 A.2d 606, 610
(Pa. 2000).
96 I.K. v. Sc
h. Dist. ofHaverfordTwp., 961 F. Supp. 2d674, 690 (E.D. Pa. 2013).
97 Id. at702.
98 Cl
evengerv. OliverIns. Agency, Inc., 237 S.W.3d 588, 590 (Mo. 2007).
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id. at591.
102 Mi
dwestEnergyv. Orion Food Sys., Inc. 14S.W.3d 154, 165 (Mo. Ct. App.
2000);see also Meinhold v. Huang, 687 S.W.2d 596, 599 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985)
(noting that the doctrine of prom issory estoppel has been resorted to in
Missouriin extrem e cases and only to avoid unjust results and giving as
exam plescasesin which form erem ployeessued to recoverlifetim e pensions
prom ised tothem iftheyretired).
94 Id.
95
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Courtshavealsograppled with appropriaterem ediesin prom issory estoppelcaseswhen therighttoa jurywasnotan issue. The
Alabam a Suprem eCourthasheld thatcourtsshould award reliancedam agesin prom issoryestoppelcases, lim ited bytheam ount
that would be recoverable in an action for breach ofcontract,
because prom issory estoppelplaintiffs should not be in better
positionsthan ifthey had been abletorecoverforbreach ofcontract.103 The courtwas reluctantto award specificperform ance
in prom issory estoppelactions because specific perform ance, although an equitable rem edy, satisfies the expectation interest,
and the plaintiffwould be receiving the benefitofthe bargain insteadofdam agesresultingfrom relianceon abroken prom ise.104
Ifthe law m ade itclearthatprom issory estoppelwasa substituteforconsideration in thelim ited circum stancewhen a prom iseereliestotheirdetrim enton prom isesthata prom isorknows
willinduceaction by theprom isee, theresultwould bean enforceable contractwhich would perm itthe non-breaching party to collectdam agesbased on theirexpectation interestsand havetheir
casedecidedbyajury. Much oftheconfusion wouldbeelim inated.
III. THE COMMON LAW EXPANSION OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL
Section 90 oftheRestatem entofContracts(1932)statesthat
[a] prom ise which the prom isor should reasonably expect to induceaction orforbearanceof a definite and substantial character
on thepartoftheprom iseeand which doesinducesuch action or
forbearance is binding ifinjustice can be avoided only by enforcem entofthe prom ise.105
Thecom m entson theRestatem ent(Second)ofContracts(1981)
note thatSection 90 is often referred to in term s of
prom issory
106
estoppel.
 Section 90 says:
A prom isewhich theprom isorshould reasonably expecttoinduceaction orforbearanceon thepartoftheprom iseeorathird
person and which does induce such action or forbearance is
binding ifinjusticecan be avoided only by enforcem entofthe
103

Wyattv. BellSouth, Inc., 757 So.2d 403, 408 (Ala. 2000).

104 Id.
105
106

RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §90 (1932)(em phasisadded).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF CONTRACTS §90 cm t. a(1981).
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prom ise. The rem edy granted for breach m ay be lim ited as
justicerequires.107

The six words in the originalRestatem ent that were deleted
from theSecond area good indication ofthedirection courtshad
taken in the fifty years between them , and continue to take to
thisday.108 By 1981, any action taken by a prom isee(notnecessarilya definiteand substantialaction)in responsetoa prom ise
theprom isorshould haveknown would induceaction createsan
enforceable contract, ifnon-enforcem ent would seem unfair.109
Instead of an easily applied rule about consideration, courts
substituted an ad hocfactualdecision aboutinjustice.110
In 1966, an appellate court in New Jersey, noting that no
courtin New Jersey had applied the doctrine ofprom issory estoppel, quoted aNew JerseySuprem eCourtJustice:
Thelaw shouldbebasedon currentconceptsofwhatisrightand
justand the judiciary should be alertto the never-ending need
for keeping its com m on law principles abreastofthe tim es.
Ancient distinctions which m ake no sense in today
s society
and tend todiscreditthelaw should bereadilyrejected.111

Although itwould m ake no sense to argue thatthe law should
never change, but should adhere to rules no longer usefulin
m odern society, substituting vague notionsoffairnessforeasily
understood rules for transactions between businesspeople does
notadvance the law. Once you go down the path ofelim inating
theconsideration requirem enton thegroundsofjustice, itisnot
difficult to elim inate the statute offrauds as wellin order to
m ete out justice.112 For exam ple, the Restatem ent (Second)of
Contractsin section 139 providesthat:
Id. §90.
Compare RESTATEMENT (FIRST)OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1932), with RESTATEMENT (
SECOND)OF CONTRACTS §90 (1981).
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 E. A. Coroni
sAssocs. v. M. Gordon Constr. Co., 216 A.2d 246, 251 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1966)(citingJacobs, J. in Schipperv. Levitt& Sons, 207
A.2d 314, 325 (N.J. 1965)).
112 Argum ent
s are m ade supporting the elim ination of the doctrine of
consideration and the statute offrauds, but that discussion is beyond the
scope ofthis paper, which assum es that both rem ain basic tenets ofU.S.
107
108
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[a]prom ise which the prom isor should reasonably expectto
induce action orforbearance on the partofthe prom isee ora
third person and which doesinducetheaction orforbearanceis
enforceablenotwithstanding theStatuteofFraudsifinjustice
can beavoided onlybyenforcem entoftheprom ise.113

IV. WEAKENING THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
In 1997, theSuprem eCourtofAlaska, in a caseoffirstim pression, noted thatthepurposeofthestatuteoffraudsistoprevent
fraud, not to be an escape route for persons seeking to avoid
obligations.114 Thecourtquoted ArthurCorbin, therealistchief
reporteroftheRestatem ent(Second)ofContracts, assertingin 1950
that m any courts are now prepared to use prom issory estoppel
to overcom e the requirem entsofthe statute offrauds,and joined
the approach of those courts in em ploym ent disputes.115 The
plaintiffin the case wasan experienced executive in the Dem ocraticParty whosued on an alleged oralcontractfora two-year
executivedirector
sjob thatfailed tom aterialize.116 Shewasnotan
contract law. See, e.g., United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
InternationalSale ofGoods, Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 (stating thata
contract of sale need not be concluded in or evidenced by writing);Law
Reform (Enforcem entofContracts)Act, 1954, 2 & 3 Eliz. 2, c.34, § 1 (Eng.)
(elim inatingconsideration requirem entform ostcontractsin United Kingdom );
Barry Hough & Ann Spowart-Taylor, The Doctrine of Consideration: Dead or
Alive in English Employment Contracts?, 17 J. CONT. L. 193 (2001)(notingthat
in English em ploym entlaw, the classicaldoctrine ofconsideration is falling
intodesuetudeand nolongerconvincinglyexplainsthedistinction between nonenforceable from enforceable obligations);Joseph M. Perillo, The Statute of
Frauds in the Light of the Functions and Dysfunctions of Form, 43 FORDHAM
L. REV. 39, 42 (1974)(acknowledging criticswhoarguethatstatuteoffrauds
should beelim inated);Significant Changes in the Proposed Revision of Article 2
on Sales, SB29 ALI-ABA 143 (1996)(noting proposalto UCC § 2201 to elim inatestatuteoffraudsforcontractsforgoods).
113 RESTATEMENT (
SECOND)OF CONTRACTS §139 (1981).
114 Al
aska Dem ocratic Party v. Rice, 934 P.2d 1313, 1316 (Alaska 1997)
(citing Eavenson v. LewisMeans, Inc., 105 N.M. 161, 730 P.2d 464, 465 (1986),
overruled on other grounds by Strata Prod. Co. v. Mercury Expl. Co., 121 N.M.
622, 916 P.2d 822 (1996)).
115 Id. But see St
ephen J. Leacock, Fingerprints of Equitable Estoppel and
Promissory Estoppel on the Statute of Frauds in Contract Law, 2 WM. & MARY
BUS. L. REV. 73, 117 (2011) (asserting that [c]ourts have generally not
allowed a prom issory estoppelclaim to defeata Statute ofFraudsdefense in
theem ploym entcontext).
116 Alaska Democratic Party, 934P.2d at1315.
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inexperienced noviceworkeroran unsophisticated consum er.117
Any first-yearbusiness law studentknows thata contractthat
cannotbeperform ed within oneyearm ustbein writing tobeenforceable.118 Ifthatruleisappliedonlywhen thereisafraud, then
itbecom esreduced to the am assing ofevidence to indicate that
therewasindeedan oralcontract;thatis, noruleatall, even ifthe
evidence required ischaracterized asclearand convincing.119
In 2012, theSuprem eCourtofAlaska extended itsprom issory
estoppelexception to the statute offrauds in holding thatthe
exception could apply in a land sale case.120 In thatcase, both
partieswerebusinessowners,121 notunsophisticated consum ers,
who should have known to protectthem selves by putting their
agreem ent in writing. Furtherm ore, the court gratuitously allowed the possible application ofprom issory estoppelwhen the
sam e resultcould have been achieved by the application ofthe
partperform anceexception tothestatuteoffrauds.122 Thelatter
isam uch m orelim ited exception.
In 2007, theUnited StatesDistrictCourtin Kansascited the
KansasSuprem eCourtfortheproposition thatprom issory estoppelcan overcom e the statute offrauds ifthe application ofthe
statute offraudswould work a fraud ora grossinjustice upon the
prom isee.123 In fact, both partiesin thatcase were experienced
com panies:one, a supplierofcom puterhardwareforpoint-of-sale
system s;the other, a seller offood service technology solutions
to schools throughout the country.124 Therefore, it is hard to
understand why these com panies could notprotectthem selves
in written contractsabsentanym isrepresentationsoffact.
In 2001, the Suprem e CourtofSouth Dakota asserted that
the statute offrauds willnotbe used to work an injustice, and
See CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note74, §19.1
See id. §19.1.
119 Alaska Democratic Party, 934 P.2d at1317. More t
han 40 years ago,
Professor Perillo asserted thata requirem entofclear and convincing evidence
[should] be substituted for the writing requirem ent to do justice without
technicaland artificialrules.Perillo, supra note112, at82.
120 Ki
ernan v. Creech, 268 P.3d 312, 314, 316 (Alaska2012).
121 Id. at314.
122 Id. at31718.
123 Sc
hool-Link Tech., Inc. v. Applied Res., Inc., 471 F. Supp. 2d1101, 1114(D.
Kan. 2007)(citingDecaturCo-op. Ass
n v. Urban, 547 P.2d 323, 329 (Kan. 1976)).
124 Id. at1106.
117
118
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affirm ed a lowercourt
sruling thatprom issory estoppelrem oved
an agreem entfrom the statute offrauds.125 Itwasclearin this
casethatthetrialcourtfound theplaintiffasserting prom issory
estoppelto be a m uch m ore sym pathetic witness than the defendant.126 ButtheSouth Dakota courthad a historyofallowing
prom issoryestoppeltoovercom eastatuteoffraudsdefense.127
In Duarte v. Wells Fargo Bank,128 the courtheld thatunder
Nevada law, thestatuteoffraudscannotbeadefensetoa prom issory estoppelclaim because the statute offrauds applies to
contracts, and prom issory estoppelexistsonly when there isno
contract.129 Sim ilarly, the United States DistrictCourtin New
Ham pshire held thatunderNew Ham pshire law, the statute of
frauds is nota bar to a prom issory estoppelclaim because the
statute offraudsappliesto contractsand a prom issory estoppel
claim isbased on theabsenceofa contract.130 An ArkansasCourt
ofAppealshasheld thatprom issory estoppelcan defeata statuteoffraudsdefense.131
TheSuprem eCourtofWyom ing hasalsoheld thatprom issory
estoppelcan beused toenforcean oralprom isethatfallswithin
the statute offrauds.132 The courtrecognized prom issory estoppelas both a defense and a cause ofaction.133 The courtdownplayed theim portanceofthestatuteoffraudsby asserting that,
unlike the difficulty seventeenth century English courts had in
detecting perjury, m odern courtsarecapableofdiscovering perjury.134 The court did not consider the value ofthe statute of

Jacobson v. Gulbransen, 623 N.W.2d 84, 9091 (S.D. 2001).
Id. at88.
127 See, e.g., Far
m ersElevatorCo. v. Lyle, 238 N.W.2d290, 293 (S.D. 1976).
128 Duart
e v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 3:13-cv-00371-RCJ-VPC, 2014
WL 585802, at*3 (D. Nev. Feb. 14, 2014).
129 Id.
130 See, e.g., GE Mobi
le Water, Inc. v. Red DesertReclam ation, LLC, 6 F.
Supp. 3d 195, 202 (D.N.H. 2014);Em bree v. Bank ofN.Y. Mellon, No. 12-cv462-JL, 2013 WL 6384776, at*5 (D.N.H. Dec. 6, 2013).
131 Count
ryCornerFood& Drug, Inc. v. Reiss, 737 S.W.2d672, 674(Ark. 1987).
132 B & W Gl
ass, Inc. v. WeatherShield Mfg., Inc., 829 P.2d 809, 809 (Wyo.
1992).
133 Id. at813.
134 Id. at819.
125
126
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frauds in prom oting certainty, clarity, and seriousness ofpurpose, in addition todiscouragingperjury.135
A California courtofappealasserted in 1988 thatnoCalifornia casehad directlyallowed thedoctrineofprom issoryestoppel
to actas an exception to the statute offrauds provision in the
CaliforniaUniform Com m ercialCode.136 However, sincethattim e,
therehavebeen casesin which courtshaveinterpreted California
law asallowing claim sofprom issory estoppelto overcom e statute offrauds requirem ents to avoid injustice when detrim ental
reliance has caused unconscionable injury.137 Unconscionable
injury m ay sound like a high bar, and itis a high barin som e
states,138 butthe California courtofappealdefined itm erely as
the injury resulting from denying enforcem entofa contractafter
one party is induced by anotherparty to seriously change position relying upon the oralagreem ent.139 Thism erely soundslike
theusualinjurythatwould resultfrom abreach ofcontract.140
An outstanding exam ple ofa court
s using a m istaken notion
ofjusticetoignorethestatuteoffraudsin favorofsupportingan
allegation ofprom issoryestoppeloccurredin Hawaiiin 2013.141 The
United StatesDistrictCourtin Hawaiicited a HawaiiSuprem e
Courtopinion thatquoted section 139 oftheRestatem ent(Second)
ofContractsfortheproposition thatthestatuteoffraudsisnot
an autom aticbarto the enforcem entofan oralcontractforthe

Current Legislation, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 206, 207 (1929)(giving reason
forrequiringwritingforcontractenforceability, in addition toavoidingperjury,
encouragingthoughtfulness).
136 Al
lied Grape Growers v. Bronco Wine Co., 203 Cal. App. 3d 432, 442
(Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
137 See, e.g., Si
am Num hong Prods. Co. v. Eastim pex, 866 F. Supp. 445, 448
(N.D. Cal. 1994)(allegedUCC contractinvolvingwildbam booshoots);Peterson v.
Bank ofAm ., N.A., No. 09cv2570-WQH-CAB, 2010 WL 1881070, at*6 (alleged
agreem entforloan payoff);Rijhwaniv. WellsFargoHom eMortg., Inc., No. C 1305881 LB, 2014WL 890016, at*12 (alleged agreem entforloan m odification).
138 See Robi
nsv. Zwirner, 713 F. Supp. 2d 367, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)(citing
Merex A.G. v. Fairchild Weston Sys., Inc., 29 F.3d 821, 827 (2d Cir. 1994))
(theNew York definition ofunconscionableinjury forthepurposeofallowing
prom issoryestoppeltoovercom eastatuteoffraudswritingrequirem ent).
139 Allied Grape Growers, 203 Cal
. App. 3d at444.
140 Id.
141 Au v. Republ
ic State Mortg. Co., No. CIV. 11-00251 JMS, 2013 WL
1339738, at*5 (D. Haw. Mar. 29, 2013).
135
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purchaseofland.142 Thedistrictcourtnoted thattheplaintiffasserting prom issory estoppelhad practiced law forforty-twoyears,
understood realestatecontracts, knew whathe wasdoing,and
adm itted thathe was 
absolutely ... fam iliarwith thestatuteof
143
frauds.
 Nevertheless, based on the plaintiff
s allegation that
the defendantorally agreed to change the term s ofa note and
m ortgage, the courtdenied the defendant
s sum m ary judgm ent
m otion to dism iss the prom issory estoppelcount.144 This case
indicatesthefragility ofa statuteoffrauds, resulting in thecreation of great uncertainty in undertaking contractual obligations. Itsuggeststhatthelaw willprotectthosewhodonotprotect
them selvesin spiteofsophisticated knowledgeaboutbusinessand
thelaw.145
TheNew York CourtofAppealshasheld thatthedoctrineof
prom issory estoppeldoesnotpreclude using the statute offrauds
asan affirm ative defenseto the enforcem entofan orallease.146
In New York, prom issory estoppel can theoretically overcom e
thestatuteoffrauds, butitism oredifficultthan in otherstates
because the prom isee m ustdem onstrate notm erely a gross injusticebutalsounconscionableinjury.147 TheUnited StatesCourt
ofAppeals for the Second Circuithas defined an 
unconscionable injuryas
beyond thatwhich flowsnaturally ... from the nonperform ance of the unenforceable agreem ent,
 and a greater
injury than one thatis... predictable and ... the consequencesof
the [prom isee
s]own choice[].148 Thisisa m uch higherstandard
than theonethathasbeen appliedin California.149
The Superior Courtin Connecticut, relying in parton New
York
s allowing prom issory estoppelto overcom e the statute of
Id. at*4(citingMcIntoshv. Murphy, 469 P.2d177, 179, 181 (Haw. 1970)).
Id. at*5.
144 Id. at*7.
145 Id.
146 Cohen v. Brown, Harri
s, Stevens, Inc., 64N.Y.2d 728, 747 (1984).
147 Robi
ns v. Zwirner, 713 F. Supp. 2d 367, 37677 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). But see
ArthurB. Schwartz, The Second Circuit Estopped: There Is No Promissory
Estoppel in New York, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 1201, 1233 (1997)(arguing that,
asof1997, theNew York CourtofAppealshad neverrecognized thedoctrine
ofprom issoryestoppel).
148 713 F. Supp. 2d at377 (
quoting Merex A.G. v. Fairchild Weston Sys.,
Inc., 29 F.3d 821, 827 (2d Cir. 1994)).
149 Id.
142
143
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fraudswhen thereisevidenceofunconscionableinjury, allowed the
plaintiff
s prom issory estoppelclaim to go forward, and concluded
that[p]arties willstillhave an incentive to reduce agreem ents
to writing because enforcing a written contracton a theory of
breach ofcontractwilllikely be m uch easierthan enforcing an
oralprom ise on a theory ofprom issory estoppel.150 Theplaintiff
in thiscase wasa full-serviceenergy com pany thathad been in
businessform orethan twenty-fiveyears, had afleetofoverfifty
vehicles, m ore than sixty em ployees, and licenses to operate in
twelve states.151 The plaintiffclaim ed that the defendant had
ordered heatingoilon thephoneand thedefendantprocured the
heatingoilthesam eday, butthedefendanthad neversigned an
agreem entand then refused topay.152 Thisexperienced business
plaintiffcould haveprotected itselfbyrequiringa signed writing
before starting to act.153 The Connecticut court
s action encouragessloppybusinesspracticeand unnecessarylitigation. Ifsom e
fraud were involved orthe defendant
s actionswere unconscionable, there would be otherm eans ofdealing with those problem s
withoutallowing prom issoryestoppeltoovertakeotheraccepted
contractdoctrines.
Noteverycourthasseen thewisdom ofallowingthedoctrine
ofprom issory estoppelto overcom e the statute offrauds. The
United StatesDistrictCourtin Maineopined thatifsection 139
ofthe Restatem ent (Second)ofContracts (allowing the avoidanceofinjusticetoovercom ethestatuteoffrauds)weretobeapplied toMaine
sstatuteoffraudsorprobate statute, both would be
rendered unenforceable.154 The court offered that it could alwaysbesaidthatinjusticewillresultiftheprom iseupon which a
prom isee hasrelied isnotfulfilled.155 TheMaineSuprem eJudicialCourthad declined toallow prom issoryestoppeltoovercom e
150 E. Ri
verEnergy, Inc. v. Gaylord Hosp., Inc., No. NNHCV095029078S,
2011 WL 3198251, at*9 (Conn. Super. Ct. June15, 2011)(citing Allied Grape
Growers v. Bronco Wine Co., 203 Cal. App. 3d 432, 432 (Ct. App. 1988)).
151 EAST RIVER ENERGY, Corporate History, ht
tp://www.eastriverenergy.com
/about-us/corporate-history/[http://perm a.cc/S3YR-GAYX].
152 East River Energy, Inc., 2011 WL 3198251, at*1*2.
153 Id.
154 Robi
nson v. Miller, No. 2:11-CV-56-JHR, 2011 WL 2610193, at*56 (D.
Me. June30, 2011).
155 Id. at*6.
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the statute offrauds in em ploym ent contracts that cannot be
perform ed within oneyear.156 TheMainecourtsaid:
[a]lthough section 139 of the Restatem ent m ay prom ote
justice in othersituations, in the em ploym entcontextitcontravenes the policy ofthe Statute to preventfraud. Itis too
easy fora disgruntled form erem ployeetoallegerelianceon a
prom ise, butdifficultfactually todistinguish such reliancefrom
theordinarypreparationsthatattendanynew em ploym ent.157

Notwithstanding the Suprem e Judicial Court
s absolute statem entin the em ploym entcontext, itdid allow a prom issory estoppelclaim toproceed in a caseinvolvingtheenforcem entofan
oralprom isetosign a realpropertycontractthatwould havebeen
unenforceableunderthestatuteoffrauds.158 In 2014, in a prom issory estoppelcase concerning the Uniform Com m ercialCode
Statute ofFrauds, the United States CourtofAppeals for the
First Circuit concluded that the Maine court was seek[ing] a
m iddlecoursebetween an outrightbaron theuseofprom issory
estoppelon one hand and the wholesale use ofthe doctrine to
evade the Statute on the other.159
The Florida Suprem e Courtspecifically refused to allow the
statuteoffraudstobeovercom ebyprom issory estoppel.160 Itasserted thatthestatuteoffraudsshould bestrictlyconstrued visà-vis the doctrine ofprom issory estoppelso that parties to a
contractcan fully understand or be advised oftheir rights and
obligations.161 An Arizona appellate courtheld thatprom issory
estoppelcannotbeused toovercom ethestatuteoffraudsbecause
holdingotherwisewouldrenderthestatuteoffraudsofnoeffect.162
Stearnsv. Em ery-WaterhouseCo., 596 A.2d 72 (Me. 1991).
Id. at7475.
158 Chapm an v. Bom ann, 381 A.2d 1123, 1129 (
Me. 1978).
159 Pac
kgenv. BP Exploration& Prod., Inc., 754F.3d61, 73 (1stCir. 2014).
160 Tanenbaum v. Bi
scayne Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 190 So. 2d 777, 779
(Fla. 1966).
161 Shore Hol
dings, Inc. v. Seagate Beach Quarters, Inc., 842 So. 2d 1010,
101213 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)(citing Yates v. Ball, 181 So. 341 (Fla. 1938)
and W.R. Grace& Co. v. GeodateServ., Inc., 547 So. 2d 919, 925 (Fla. 1989)).
See also Farm CreditofNw. Fla., ACA v. Easom PeanutCo., 718 S.E.2d590, 602
(Ga. Ct. App. 2011)(asserting that, underFlorida Law, a party m ay notcircum venttherequirem entsofthestatuteoffraudsby allegingprom issoryestoppel).
162 Ti
ffany Inc. v. W. M. K. TransitMix, Inc., 493 P.2d 1220, 1226 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1972).
156
157
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In Tennessee, prom issory estoppelisnotan exception to the
statute offrauds.163 Nevertheless, one com m entatorhasargued
that, because the Tennessee Suprem e Courthas recognized exceptionstothestatuteoffraudswhen enforcing thestatutewould
perpetrate a fraud, it would be only an increm ental change in
Tennessee lawfor prom issory estoppelto override the statute,
aswell.164 To the contrary, the Tennessee CourtofAppealshas
called the statute of frauds a venerable rule of law and has
noted that the Tennessee Suprem e Court
s m ore restrictive
view, lim iting application ofprom issory estoppelto 
exceptional
cases where to enforce the statute offrauds would m ake itan
instrum entofhardship and oppression, verging on actualfraud.
165
In fact, nostatewillenforcea statuteoffraudstoabetfraud,166
so a defense offraud orunconscionability orequitable estoppel
isalwaysavailabletoenforce an oralprom ise.167 Itonly creates
am biguity and uncertainty toallow a claim ofprom issory estoppeltoovercom eastatuteoffrauds.
Texascourtshave decided m any prom issory estoppelcases.168
Since the 2009 econom ic downturn, m any ofthese cases have
involved m ortgage foreclosuresand hom eownersalleging prom isesm ade by lenders.169 In Martin-Janson v. JP Morgan Chase
Bank,170 forexam ple, the hom eownerreceived a foreclosure notice after m issing two consecutive m onthly paym ents.171 She
Launiusv. Wells Fargo Bank, No. 3:09-CV-501, 2010 WL 3429666, at
*6 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 27, 2010).
164 St
even W. Feldm an, Avoidance of Requirements-Promissory Estoppel,
21 TENN. PRAC. CONTRACT L. & PRAC. §2:33 (2014).
165 Shedd v. Gayl
ord Entm 
tCo., 118 S.W.3d 695, 697, 700 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2003).
166 See, e.g., S. St
atesDev. Co. v. Robinson, 494 S.W.2d 777, 78182 (1972)
(citingHackneyv. Hackney, 27 Tenn. 452, 8 Hum . 452 (1847)).
167 Id.
168 See, e.g., Tram m elCrow Co. v. Harki
nson, 944 S.W.3d 631 (Tex. 1997);
English v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. 1983);Nagle v. Nagle, 633 S.W.2d
796 (Tex. 1982).
169 See, e.g., Mar
tin-Janson v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 536 Fed. App
x
394 (5th Cir. 2013);Franco v. U.S. Bank Nat
lAss
n, No. SA-14-CV-636-XR,
2014 WL 4441224 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 8, 2014);Hayesv. Bank ofAm ., N.A., No.
4:13-CV-760-A, 2014 WL 308129 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 27, 2014);Moore v. Fed.
Nat
lMortgageAss
n, No. H-12-1518, 2012 WL 6048999 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 5, 2012).
170 536 Fed. App
x 394 (5th Cir. 2013).
171 Id. at395.
163
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then had m any com m unications with the lender, who allegedly
told herthatherreceiptofa loan m odification wasim m inent.172
After about two years ofthe lender
s alleged assurances that a
m odification wasforthcom ing, thehom eownerreceived a form al
notice ofacceleration and trustee
s sale, and she filed lawsuits
challenging the foreclosure on the basis ofprom issory estoppel
aswellasothercausesofaction.173 Texashasastatuteoffrauds
forloan agreem entsin excessoffifty thousand dollars, and the
United States DistrictCourtfor the Western DistrictofTexas
concluded thatthe hom eowner
sclaim swere barred by the statute
offrauds.174 Texas has an unusualrule forthe relationship between thedoctrineofprom issoryestoppeland thestatuteoffrauds.
Generally, the doctrine willnotovercom e the statute;however,
thedoctrinewillprevailiftheallegedprom iseism erelytosign an
already existing written agreem entthatwould satisfy the statute.175 TheCourtofAppealsfortheFifth Circuitoverturned the
districtcourtbecausethehom eowneralleged that, based on the
lender
srepeated assertionsthatherreceiptofa loan m odification
wasim m inent, shebelieved thattheloan m odification agreem ent
had been prepared but never sent to her.176 The Fifth Circuit
held thattheagreem entwould satisfy the statuteoffraudsand
thehom eownercouldproceedwithherprom issoryestoppelclaim .177
In contrast, in anothercasein which a hom eownerfacingforeclosurefornon-paym entbroughtan action forprom issory estoppelbased on an alleged oralm odification agreem ent, theUnited
StatesDistrictCourtfortheWestern DistrictofTexasheld that
the hom eowner
s reliance on oralrepresentations m ade by the
lenderwasunreasonableasa m atteroflaw.178 Thedistrictcourt
cited a Texasappellate courtforthe proposition that[a]party
to an arm 
s length transaction m ustexercise ordinary care and
reasonable diligence forthe protection ofhisown interests, and
a failuretodosoisnotexcused bym ereconfidencein thehonesty
Id. at39596.
Id. at396.
174 Id. at39697.
175 Davi
dson v. JP Morgan Chase, N.A., No. 4:
13-CV-3698, 2014 WL 4924128,
at*8 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2014).
176 536 Fed. App
x at399.
177 Id.
178 Mont
alvov. Bank ofAm . Corp., No. SA-10-CV-360-XR, 2013 WL 870088,
at*13 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 7, 2013).
172
173
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and integrity ofthe otherparty.179 Thecourtnoted thattheplaintiffwas notunsophisticated aboutfinancialm atters because she
was a m anager ofa large pawn shop and had been trained in
Texaslendinglaws.180 Moreover, theloan agreem entspecifically
prohibited oralm odifications and underTexas law
reliance on
an oral statem ent is unreasonable as a m atter of law if the
statem ent is controverted by the plain language ofa binding
written contract.181
TheSuprem eCourtoftheStateofWashington hasspecifically
declined to allow prom issory estoppelto overcom e a valid defensebased on thestatuteoffraudsin theUniform Com m ercial
Code.182 Thecourtem phasized theim portanceofuniform ityam ong
thestatesasa prim epurposeoftheUniform Com m ercialCode.183
Itviewed enforcing thestatuteoffraudsasa way tolim itlitigation and confusion.184 The Washington Suprem e Court also refused to allow the prom issory estoppeldoctrine to overcom e the
statute offrauds in a wrongfulterm ination case,185 a franchise
agreem entcase,186 and a consulting case.187 Lastyear, theUnited StatesDistrictCourtfortheWestern DistrictofWashington,
applying Washington law, noted on severaloccasions that the
Washington Suprem eCourthasconsistently declined toallow a
prom issoryestoppelclaim toavoid thestatuteoffrauds.188
V. ENCOURAGING CONFUSION AND LITIGATION
North Carolinaprobablyhasthem ostrestrictivelaw governing
prom issory estoppelam ong statesthatrecognizethedoctrine.189
179 Id. at*12 (
citing DRC Parts& Accessories, LLC v. VM Motori, S.P.A.,
112 S.W.3d 854, 858 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003)).
180 Id. at*14.
181 Id.
182 Li
geDickson Co. v. Union OilCo., 635 P.2d 103, 107 (Wash. 1981).
183 Id. (
citingUCC §1-102(2)(c)).
184 Id.
185 Greavesv. Med. Im agi
ng Sys., Inc., 879 P.2d 276, 28283 (Wash. 1994).
186 Kl
inkev. Fam ousRecipeFriedChicken, Inc., 616 P.2d644(Wash. 1980).
187 Lect
us, Inc. v. RainierNat
lBank, 647 P.2d 1001 (Wash. 1982).
188 Rut
herford v. Chase Bank, N.A., No. 2:13-cv-01175-MJP, 2014 WL
4540066, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 11, 2014);Nicholson v. Thrifty Payless,
Inc., No. C12-1121RSL, 2014WL 618894, at*2 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 18, 2014).
189 Hom eEl
ec. Co. ofLenoir, Inc. v. Hall& Underdown Heating & AirConditioningCo., 358 S.E.2d 539, 541 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987).
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North Carolina courts have neverrecognized prom issory estoppelasa substituteforconsideration.190 Theonlycircum stancein
which North Carolina courtshaverecognized prom issory estoppel
is as a defense involving the waiver of a preexisting legal
right.191 Forexam ple, in Wachovia Bank v. Rubish,192 a tenant
relied on his landlord
s prom ise notto require written notice to
renew hislease.193 Thetenantasserted prom issory estoppelasa
defense when, after the landlord
s death, the landlord
s executors
brought an action for sum m ary ejectm ent.194 The court stated
thata prom issory estoppeltheory ofthe caseispossiblebased on
the landlord
s waiver of two prior breaches of the condition of
written notice, and thedefendant
srelianceon theprom iseim plied
from thesewaiversthatnowritten noticewould berequired.195
The North Carolina Court ofAppeals chastised the United
StatesCourtofAppealsforthe Fourth Circuitforholding that,
under North Carolina law, prom issory estoppelcould be used
affirm atively in a construction bid case to allow the plaintiffto
recover the difference between the price ofthe defendant
s oral
bid and the price the plaintiffhad to pay when the defendant
was unable to deliver.196 The court opined that [a]llowing a
causeofaction based on prom issoryestoppelin construction bidding createsthe potentialforinjustice.197 A contractorcan use
a subcontractor
sbid to geta job, butisnotobligated tousethat
subcontractor while, under a prom issory estoppel theory, the
subcontractorwillbebound toactin accordancewith hisorher
bid.198 Mostim portantly, contractorscan protectthem selvesbycontractingwith subcontractorsdependentupon asuccessfulbid.199
Id.
Id. at54142.
192 293 S.E.2d 749 (
N.C. 1982).
193 Id. at751.
194 Id.
195 Id. at757.
196 Home Elec. Co., 358 S.E.2d at542.
197 Id.
198 Id. at542. But see Newt
on TractorSales, Inc. v. Kubota TractorCorp.,
906 N.E.2d 520, 527 (Ill. 2009)(asserting the court
s conviction that prom issory estoppelas an independentcause ofaction willnotnegatively affect
relationship between subcontractorsand generalcontractors).
199 Home Elec. Co., 358 S.E.2d at542.
190
191
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Differencesin opinion aboutprom issoryestoppelbetween state
courts and federalcourts applying the sam e state law are not
lim ited toNorth Carolina.200 Thisvariation in approach, in addition to the differencesam ong states, isfurtherindication ofthe
difficulty in com ing to term s about what prom issory estoppel
actually m eansand whatitshould accom plish. TheUnited States
DistrictCourtin South Carolina held thatprom issory estoppel
could notbeused to avoid the Uniform Com m ercialCode
s statute offrauds, because tohold otherwise would renderthe statute
a nullity.201 Twoyearslater, theSouth CarolinaCourtofAppeals
held thatprom issoryestoppelcan overcom ethestatuteoffrauds
in South Carolina.202 However, itm ayberelevantthatthedefendantassertingthestatuteoffraudswasaNew York residentwho
ordered silveroverthephonefrom aSouth Carolina com pany.203
The com pany purchased the silver and awaited the defendant
s
204
paym ent.
The price ofthe silver went down by about twothirds, and the defendantrefused to pay.205 The com pany sued
thedefendant, allegingprom issoryestoppel.206 Thisisthekind of
surm ise thatbecom es available when courts are deciding cases
based on ad hocnotionsofjustice.
A database counseling on how to litigate wrongfuldischarge
cases advises thata prom issory estoppelclaim should alm ostalwaysbe advanced as a backupto a breach ofcontractclaim .207
First, a prom issory estoppelclaim m ay succeed wherea breach of
contractwould notwhen an em ployerm akesprom isesthatwere
notsupportedbyanybargained-forconsideration on thepartofthe
em ployee;208 and second, a prom issoryestoppelclaim m aysucceed
when an oralprom isewould notbeenforceablebecauseitdidnot
See generally McDabcov. ChetAdam sCo., 548 F. Supp. 456 (D.S.C. 1982).
McDabco, 548 F. Supp. at46061.
202 At
l. WholesaleCo. v. Solondz, 320 S.E.2d 720, 723 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984).
Thecourtinquired whetherequitableestoppelcould overcom ethestatute of
frauds, butthesituation in thecaseclearlyinvolved prom issoryestoppel. Id.
203 Id. at72223.
204 Id. at723.
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 PaulH. Tobi
as, 1 Litigating WrongfulDischarge Claim s § 4.38 (June
2015), available at WestlawNextLabor& Em ploym entTexts& Treatises.
208 Id.
200
201
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satisfy the statute offrauds.209 The advice warns thatthe drawbacksincludethattheem ployeem ustbeabletoprovedetrim ental
reliance, and the rem edy m ay be restricted to reliance dam ages
forexam ple, m oving expenses, new housing costs, and suspension ofpriorincom e ratherthan expectation dam agesbased on
an alleged contract.210 When getting around long-known, traditionalcontractrules has becom e the norm alway ofconducting
business, perhaps itis tim e to adm itthattort-like principles are
overcom ingcontractrules, andthatitistim eforreform .
CONCLUSION
In considering an independentcause ofaction for prom issory estoppel, thechoicesare:(1)allowingcourtstom akead hoc
decisionsaboutwhatisand isnotfairin situationsin which partiescould haveentered intoenforceablecontractsbutdid not;or
(2)expectingexperienced businesspeopletoprotectthem selvesby
adheringtotraditionalcontractrules. Thefirstchoicem aybesuitablein lim ited circum stances, such asallowingprom issoryestoppelto actasa substitute forconsideration in dom esticsituations
when particularly unsophisticated consum ersorhom eownersare
involved. The second choice is the one that is appropriate in
businesssituations. Businesspeopleshould beabletorely on predictablerulesand professionallegaladvice, and should notbeat
them ercy ofvagueclaim sofunfairnessand injustice. Businesspeople should alsobe expected to know basiccontractrulesand
when togetexpertlegaladvice.
Therewillalwaysbebusinessesthatwillconducthandshake
deals. Thatdoesnotm ean thatthosedealsshould beenforced if
theydonotsatisfystatuteoffraudsrequirem ents. Itm eansthat
such businesses have to understand the risks they are taking,
knowing thatsom etim es theirdealcounterparts willnothonor
such handshake deals. Thatfactshould becom e partofthe assessm entofbusinesscosts, risks, and insurance needs. When the
assertion it isn
t fair can overcom e traditionalcontract rules,
allbusinessesincuradditionallitigation risksthatare very unpredictable. Statelegislaturescan curetheconfusion, unpredictability, and lack ofuniform ityacrosscourtsby enacting statutes
209
210

Id.
Id.
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thatdefine prom issory estoppelas only a substitute forconsideration, which creates an enforceable contractwhen a prom ise
which theprom isorshould reasonablyexpecttoinduceaction or
forbearanceon the partoftheprom isee doesinducesuch action
orforbearance to the detrim entofthe prom isee. Ifa prom isor
s
behaviorisoutrageously unfairto an unsophisticated consum er
orhom eowner, courtscan deem thebehaviorunconscionableand
rem edy the situation withoutresorting to the confounding doctrineofprom issoryestoppel.

